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Zen in the Art of Reading
Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text
Gerald Doherty
Roland Barthes articulated his pleasure in all things Japanese in his book, 
L'Empire des Signes, his celebration of its manners, its food, its gardens, its 
poetry, and its religion where “the signs are empty and the ritual without God.’*1 
In subsequent books written in the 197O’s references to Buddhism, and more 
especially to Zen, are strewn about the text, although Barthes shows a charac­
teristic reluctance to “nominate” Zen and in so doing force it to assume the 
contours of a system, another religious ideolect (the text, as he puts it, “undoes 
nomination”: “the Name does not cross its lips,”1 2). The haiku is perhaps the 
sign of his pleasure, the form which at once articulates the void yet remains 
exempt from manifest content.
1 I have used the translation given in Philip Thody’s book Roland Barthes: A Con­
servative Estimate (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 122.
2 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (London: Jona­
than Cape, 1976), p. 45. Subsequent references to this work will be cited parenthetically 
in my text by the abbreviated title, PT, and page numberfs).
3 Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (London: Macmillan, 
1977), p. 93.
Barthes’s later books, particularly The Pleasure of the Text and Roland Barthes 
by Roland Barthes, are themselves kinds of haiku performances, short aphoristic 
fragments arranged in the “unmotivated order” of an alphabetical sequence, 
designed to defeat expectations of a developing content or meaning (thus you 
can make your entrance into or exit out of the text at whatever point you please). 
The risk of “incoherence” is preferable to that of a “distorting order.”3 In the 
manner of the haiku and the Zen mondos, each fragment is designed to detonate 
its “significance” in a way which precludes interpretations or conclusions arrived 
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at through ratio-logical processes (this is one reason why Western critics have 
found the later Barthes impossibly unsystematic or have endeavoured to impose 
the kind of structural ordering on the text which the text itself is designed to re­
sist). The Pleasure of the Text, in particular, is a sequence of meditations on the 
“pleasure” of reading, and more especially on what Barthes calls its "bliss” 
whose paradoxical quality is to be "beyond words,” unspeakable; "nothing 
separates it from satori, from losing,” as he puts it (PT 35). This is one of the 
apparently casual references to Zen in the book. It seems, however, that the 
book’s debt to Zen goes deeper than these scattered and fairly superficial allu­
sions might suggest. Indeed it would appear that the Barthesian approaches to 
the "bliss” of the text bear a remarkable resemblance to the Zen approaches 
to the experience of reality itself (since, for Barthes, the world is an infinite text, 
there is a sense in which the nature of reality and that of the text coincide). 
More specifically it seems possible to identify in Barthes’s book three levels 
which have striking parallels with the three "stages” of Zen realization as they 
are articulated in Ch’ing-yuan’s celebrated mini-text ("Before I studied Zen, 
to me mountains were mountains and waters were waters ...”) and which are 
implicit in many other Zen mondos and koans. An exploration of the details 
of this resemblance (and debt) will form the substance of this essay (the essay 
itself inevitably assuming the contours of yet another "distorting order”), and 
more especially of the way in which Barthes’s brilliant improvisations on these 
three basic "stages” constitute radical reassessments of the processes of reading 
and writing and of the means through which we re-create and reconstitute 
ourselves and the world in so doing.
I. Euphoria
It is unnecessary here to explicate in detail Ch’ing-yuan’s three "stages” or 
to emphasize that they are not formal steps in a logico-temporal sequence. It 
is sufficient to recall that the first "stage” sharply discriminates the mountain 
from the man, the object-seen from the subject-seer, the mountain substance 
from the essential self. In the corresponding universe of language each signifier 
has its signified, each form its content, each word has its direct referent in the 
real world which both defines and delimits it. Word-meanings are hypostatized 
in the projection of a world of established structures and fixed essences 
(Nagaijuna’s point that words take on meaning not from any reference to "real” 
objects but rather through their relational identity with each other is close to 
that of Saussure’s4). Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text presents a versatile and 
4 For a useful discussion of semantic theory in relation to Mahayana Buddhism, 
see Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (Tehran: Imperial Iranian 
Academy of Philosophy, 1977) pp. 103-106.
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subversive expose of the common-sense (or in his terms “natural”) assumptions 
which underlie this “first-stage” reading of the text and the world.
Barthes characterizes this state of language as conformist and “canonical,” 
that established by “schooling, good usage, literature, culture” (PT 6). It 
generates utopian texts for grammarians, with its syntax and functions, its tropes 
and modalities. Its micro-model is the sentence itself with its implicit ethnocen­
tric hierarchies, its “subjections, subordinations, internal reactions.” Through 
the inevitability of its completion it projects a world of closed and finalized 
structures through which things can be mastered and brought into subjection 
(it is also the state of language with which the Zen masters of the mondos initially 
confront and test their novices with such double-edged questions as “Where have 
you come from?” or “How far have you travelled?”). Barthes identifies it (in 
its political context) with the language of institutionalized power in which ideo­
logical jargons compete with each other and systematically produce an “adversary 
figure,” who may be rejected or recuperated at will. Barthes speaks of a “warrior 
topos” a site which generates language as a weapon, and which at the same time 
suppresses its own doubts, contradictions, and friabilities (PT 27-29; 50-51).
The classic realist novel is the epitome of this first “stage” reading of the world, 
the form which domesticates artifice and naturalizes language. It is the form in 
which the fragility and impermanence of the self is consistently implied (but 
never explicitly acknowledged), the narrative alternately destabilizing and 
reinforcing the ego, leading it through those plot-crises which threaten to negate 
its existence on to the kind of ultimate vindication which generally constitutes 
the narrative’s closure. And of course it is the form in which the binary opposi­
tions (or dualisms) of stereotypical perception (good/evil, sacred/profane, etc.) 
are domesticated in the text and assume the familiar configurations of fiction, 
those “characters” who confront and master each other across the spatio­
temporal site of the story (in this context it is worth noting, by contrast, the 
habitual resistance which Zen mondos and koans display to assuming a narra­
tive sequence or progress, even that of the most elementary kind as in parable 
or fable; indeed any “first-stage” anecdotal accumulation of representational 
detail, that of time or place or rank, for example, is immediately disrupted and 
dispersed by a katsu or a blow or, as I hope to show, by language itself operating 
at a different ontological level3).
Zen of course acknowledges this “first-stage” reading and structuring of the
5 At this ontological level, as we shall see, acts of interpretation, which normally 
assume a kind of gap between the text and the world which must be filled in, become 
problematic. (It is hardly an accident, however, that Ch’ing-yuan’s mini-text with its 
tripartite folktale-like structure, its semblance of a narrative order, and its peculiarly 
enigmatic deployment of language has attracted a host of interpreters.) 
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world as the indispensible basis of all mental activity (it denies, however, that 
this is the sole or exclusive approach to reality). Barthes too accepts the “pleas­
ures” of this level of reading (specifically he uses the term “pleasure” in contradis­
tinction to “bliss” to designate this level of engagement). Thus it ameliorates 
the constraints of existence, generating mood-pleasures associated with place 
or with time or with circumstance. It grants an “(extraordinary ego-reinforce­
ment (by fantasy),” repeated cultural and social reconstitutions of the self (so­
phisticated soundings, however, register this “self” as essentially fictive, the 
product of a fiat by language). This “pleasure” is linked to “a comfortable 
practice of reading”; it “contents, fills, grants euphoria.” Above all it offers a 
“consistency” of self-hood, however precarious, a linguistic site across which 
both writer and reader connive to exclude the perspectives of “loss” or of 
“emptiness” which persistently threaten to dissolve it (PT 14, 51). Like the Zen 
masters Barthes employs a host of play-techniques, ruses and sleights, raptures 
and disruptions through which to subvert and expose the common-sense “illu­
sions” upon which this first “stage” reading of the text/world is established.
II. Drifting
The opening fragment of The Pleasure of the Text postulates a new type of 
anti-hero, the man “who silently accepts every charge of illogicality,” who 
“remains passive in the face of Socratic irony,” and who, despite public ridicule, 
“endures contradiction without shame” (PT 3), a contemporary version of the 
Zen “holy fool,” the man without rank or qualities. He embodies a new mode 
of being-in-the-world, the shift from absolute “essence” into that of relatio, 
from fixed into flowing forms. Barthes characterizes this state metaphorically 
as that of “drifting,” “dissolving,” and “losing.” It corresponds to Ch’ing- 
yuan’s second “stage” (“Mountains to me are not mountains and waters are 
not waters”) in which the mountain substance loses its “solidity” and becomes 
the site of a radical “dissolve” and displacement. With the simultaneous de­
centering or de-construction of the ego-cogito, language is freed from its stereo­
typical function, the semantic articulation of the real world, and becomes “trans­
parent, permeable, flexible, and non-resistant to such a degree that it is almost 
non-existent.”6 In Barthesian terms the shift initiates the “play” of the signifier, 
the “zero” of the signified, and the release of language itself as “a primary, 
spontaneous, pragmatic force” (PT 33). Freed from the constraint of “meaning” 
each verbal sign becomes the site of an unbounded play of significance, a vibra­
tion (or detonation) felt throughout the weave of the infinite text.7 Barthes 
6 Izutsu, p. 100.
7 Barthes habitually employs the metaphor of the text as a network of shifting 
language patterns and relations in a way which resembles not only the Buddhist con-
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combines the ludic with the therapeutic in his approaches to this second “level” 
of engagement with the text/world.
It is frequently the site of a clash, an edge of confrontation between the two 
levels of language. Thus, in relation to his reading of Sade, Barthes speaks of a 
“collision” between the old reified forms, language in its conformist and “ca­
nonical” state, and “another edge, mobile, blank,” permeable, “ready to assume 
any contours.” In a manner analogous to that of the sudden disclosure of the 
Zen “abyss” of non-articulation, Barthes locates the site of the “collision” as 
“the place where the death of language is glimpsed” (PT 6-7). Indeed many of 
the Zen mondos enact exactly such a type of “collision,” the clash between two 
levels of language through which the disciple “glimpses” the void and comes to 
enlightenment. To take two examples. When the novice monk asks the fixed- 
form question, “What is the Daiba school?” Haryo offers the “mobile” reply, 
“Snow in the silver bowl” (it is precisely to prevent any codification of such re­
plies and thus to miss the “collision” that the Zen masters habitually require 
that their novices “speak, speak!”). Likewise when the disciple asks Rinzai a 
“canonical” question about the style of his song, Rinzai responds with a “con- 
tour-less” answer, “One cannot drive a nail into empty space” (Barthes’s equi­
valent legend is of the soothsayer who marked off the sky with his staff, that is, 
traced “a limit of which immediately nothing is left”8).
ception of reality but also the models used in modem biology and physics. How close 
the resemblance is may be judged from Barthes’s own reflections on his approach to 
the text: “It conceives the text as taken up in an open network which is the very in­
finity of language, itself structured without closure; it tries to say no longer from where 
the text comes (historical criticism), nor even how it is made (structural analysis), but 
how it is unmade, how it explodes, disseminates—by what coded paths it goes off” 
(see Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath [Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1979), pp. 
126-27).
* Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, p. 47.
’ Izutsu, p. 32.
For Zen this second “stage” involves a radical defamiliarization of the 
“external world” as a consequence of which “nothing may be grasped as some­
thing definite.”9 Barthes, reading the infinite world/text, speaks of “controlled 
discontinuities, faked conformities, and indirect destructions” (PT 9), fractures 
in experience in which identity and difference coexist in a state of perceptual 
tension. It is a site at once “dizzying” and dangerous, but one from which the 
horizons of “bliss” (satori) may be glimpsed. It initiates the infinite “play” of the 
signifier (its overlappings, its dislocations, its contradictions and variations), 
the point at which the text not only flows, but overflows (one recalls Isan playfully 
tipping over the water-bottle and then walking out), becoming at once un­
bounded and ludic, in excess of any purely social or structural functioning 
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(indeed the Barthesian “erotics” or “play” of the text frequently resemble the 
“play” of the typical koan: it too evades all attempts at conceptualization, all 
impositions of a signified; it in turn attracts, teases, baffles, eludes, and finally 
absorbs the subject; and it “deconstructs” him in an explosive accession to 
“bliss”). At this level the Barthesian text, like the Zen mondos, always plays 
“at the limits of sense and nonsense,” initiating a coherent argument only to 
reveal its absurdity,10 subverting both its norms and its conclusions.
10 Eve Tavor, “Critical Play: A Reading of Roland Barthes,” Orbis Litterarum 36,
I (1981), p. 2.
11 Izutsu, pp. 50-58. See also Robert E. Carter’s review of Izutsu’s book in the 
Eastern Buddhist XIII, 2 (Autumn 1980), pp. 128-29.
See Abe Masao, “Zen is not a Philosophy, but...,” Theologische Zeitschrift 
33 (1977), p. 264.
At this level too Barthes sharply distinguishes “ideological systems” (classic 
realist novels, for example) in which language conceals its message and its artifice 
behind the transparency of a representational surface from the genuinely nov- 
elistic, a site endlessly open, “a simple unstructured contour, a dissemination of 
forms, may a" (PT 27). Such openness, he suggests, may operate at the site of 
the radically new (as for example in the “exception of the Mystics” where 
discourse is destroyed, is silenced) or at that of the radically repetitive (as for 
example in the Buddhist nembutsu where to repeat is “to enter into loss, into 
the zero of the signified” [PT 41]).
Zen characterizes this second “stage” as that of no-mountain and no-self, the 
site of dissolution of the Cartesian ego-cogito. Likewise the Barthesian “subject” 
dissolves, becoming the locus at which it is neither the writer nor reader but 
language itself which performs. The personal “presence” in the text, the institu­
tionalized “subjectivity” is replaced by “a field, a vessel for expansion” (PT 5) 
(one recalls Izutsu’s use of the term “field” to designate the point at which, 
though person-hood is lost in the awareness of nothing-ness, the person remains 
as the “place” or the Barthesian “body” of this awareness* I11). Barthes represents 
it as a kind of language samadhi in which the person becomes the text, and the 
text in turn re-creates him. He characterizes this extinction of essential self-hood 
as a kind of motionless “pivoting” (like a cork on the waves) or like a fly buzzing 
“with sudden, deceptively decisive turns” (PT 18, 31). These are tropes for the 
radical decentering (or dislocation) of the self which calls values, tastes, and 
assumptions into question, and which brings language itself to a “crisis” (PT 14). 
Zen actualizes it as the simultaneous experience of void-ness and the voiding of 
the experience (“emptiness must empty itself”12). In parallel fashion Barthes 
speaks of the “dizzying schism” in the subject, “the alternation of zero and of 
its effacement” (PT 61), an alternation which negates the dualistic (and un­
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critical) disposition to judge or assess. The sole appropriate response to the text 
(and the world) is the recognitive and celebratory one, the Zen-like “That’s it!” 
(PT 13).
At this zero point the traditional alienation of reader from writer is collapsed, 
both fabricating the text and “playing” as “bodies” of awareness within it. 
Indeed the writer (like the reader) becomes “the joker in the pack, a mana, a 
zero degree ... plunged into non-profit, the Zen mushotoku" (PT 35), inhabiting 
his text here and now, speaking in it not on it, simultaneously constituted and 
dissolved by its energies. It is precisely at this level of pure play, of ludic re­
creation that (Barthes suggests) any well-ordered, straightforward, conventional 
text may be reversed and read “inside out” (PT 26) in a manner reminiscent of 
the way in which the Zen masters habitually “reversed” the straightforward 
questions posed by their novices. Thus to the monk’s well-ordered enquiry as to 
where the Buddhas come from, Ummon responds with an elegant counter­
statement, “Lo! the east mountain goes flowing over the water.” Similarly the 
last line of the celebrated Zen mini-text, “The water stands still while the bridge 
flows,” enacts a kind of Barthesian “reversal,” a subversion of representation 
which initiates the play of the text and the world. Indeed both mini-texts point 
to the void-ness at the core of language itself (“its empty center of content”), 
negating at once its metaphorical function (which indicates what its content is 
like) as well as its metonymic one (the filling in and concealment of void-ness 
with descriptions of things13 14).
13 See Frederic Jameson, The Prison-House of Language (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), pp. 122-23.
14 Izutsu, p. 101.
III. Bliss
At the third “stage” of Zen the semantic foundations of language are called 
into question. Thus Izutsu, for example, speaks of the proposition “the sky is 
blue” as representing neither an objective description of nature nor the subjec­
tive expression of a state, but as “a momentary presentation of the absolute 
Reality itself.”1* The crisis words of the typical mondo emerge as pure “sounds,” 
explosive utterances generated at the “turning point” of consciousness. They 
function solely as signs of that “turning,” configurations of void-space beyond 
the site of hearer or speaker (Izutsu’s poetics of this level of word-play seem, 
however, to be inadequate, the function of language, he suggests, being not to 
“discriminate” but to fuse “things one into the other” so that the “flower in 
poetry opens itself up to all other things in the world.” However, the poetic 
power of a haiku image (a flower image, for example) is generated not so much 
by such “fusing” but by a “collision” between states of language through which 
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the “suchness” of the flower and the void-ness of its presentation are simul­
taneously glimpsed. Thus the poetic form creates and de-creates itself, transmit­
ting at once its radiance and the extinction of that radiance at the same instant1 3). 
Barthes’s designations of the “bliss” production of language have close parallels 
with these word-manifestations at the third “stage” of Zen.
15 Izutsu, p. 132. It is worth recording here the thoroughly Barthesian comment of 
a fellow-Japanese poet on Takahashi Shinkkhi’s method of versification: “He clashes 
his idea of timelessness against the temporality of all phenomena to cause a fissure, 
through which be lets us see personally and convincingly the reality of limitless space” 
(quoted from The Penguin Book of Zen Poetry, ed. Lucien Stryk and Takashi Ikemoto 
[Penguin Books Ltd, 1981], p. 27).
16 Image Music Text, p. 62.
17 pp. 6S-69, 112-14.
18 p. 102. Mallarmd characterized this mobile, life-and-death dialectic of language 
as follows: “All (words) are quick, before they fade away, to glitter, reflecting against 
one another, with distant, oblique and contingent flashes” (quoted from Jonathan 
Culler, Structuralist Poetics, [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975], p. 246).
Barthes’s search for what he calls a “third term” of speech goes back to his 
writing of Writing Degree Zero (1953) {there, he considered his search to have 
been a failure). In a later essay on Eisenstein’s films he locates it as the “third” 
or “obtuse” meaning, identical with that of the “Japanese haiku—anaphoric 
gesture without significant content... .”15 67 This preoccupation with a “third 
term” surfaces once again in The Pleasure of the Text, where it is located, not as 
a “synthesizing” term but as “an eccentric, extraordinary term” like “laughter” 
(Barthes takes this typically Zen-like manifestation from the novelist George 
Bataille), oblique enough to evade all paradigmatic containment (PT 55). In 
Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes it becomes a “discovery” beyond any two- 
term dialectic, a “translation” in which “everything comes back, but it comes 
back as Fiction,” or “an-unheard-of speech in which the sign’s form is repeated 
but never is signified”17 (this latter designation occurs in the context of the quest 
for an erotic, utopian speech in which the void “core” of language, its ontological 
emptiness, is overcome in a “single flash,” an access to jubilatory plenitude). 
What is the nature of this Barthesian “play” or “bliss” reading?
Like the accession to satori it is in no way the fruit of a “gradual ripening”; 
rather (and here Barthes seems to bend the traditional methodological split 
between SotO and Rinzai Zen to his own purposes) everything “comes” suddenly, 
“is wrought to a transport at one and the same moment” (PT 52). Poised momen­
tarily beyond speaker and hearer, “words glisten” like “incongruous apparitions” 
(PT 42), their negation of meaning issuing in the play of significance across 
unbounded space, as in those Zen utterances where (as Izutsu puts it) “timeless 
reality glitters for a moment in a time-space dimension.”18
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Barthes once spoke of his “disease” as that of seeing language,19 the “primal 
scene” of hearing followed by a “perverse” one which engages him as “visionary” 
and “voyeur.” The “bliss” text involves a further shift towards concreteness, an 
engagement with the “materiality” of language, the words themselves in their 
“such-ness” issuing from the flesh, impressed with the musculature of the 
physical substance. The normal interpretative function of language involves a 
deciphering of the real (which in turn creates guilt in the subject); the “bliss” 
phase, by contrast, “speaks ‘reality’ (what is seen but not demonstrated)” (PT 
46), an approach to that Nietszchean innocence of perception which would 
register a tree in its absolute “such-ness,” as “a new thing at every instant” 
(PT 60-61) in exactly the same sense as JdshQ pointed at the oak-tree in the court­
yard or Nansen to the flower in the garden. Barthes further characterizes this 
“materiality” as the forging of a new “language substance,” the “transmuta­
tion” (like that of “incandescent metal”) not of a language but of language itself 
(PT 31).
19 Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, p. 161.
20 Abe, p. 265.
In the same way too as Zen habitually collapses the boundaries between the 
sacred and the profane, the meditative and the active states, the Barthesian 
“bliss” text would “abolish the false opposition of practical life and contempla­
tive life,” at once equalizing and materializing the pleasure, and rendering it 
as concrete as that of a “dish, a garden, an encounter, a voice ...” (PT 58-59). 
Ceasing to be an abstract configuration of signs, the text is substantialized as a 
living “tissue,” a texture in which “the subject unmakes himself, like a spider 
dissolving in the constructive secretions of its web.” Like the body substance 
itself (when the spirit-matter split is abolished) the text ceases to “veil” a hidden 
truth, a personal meaning; all that is, is manifest (PT 64).
The third Zen “stage” is characterized metaphorically as that of the “great 
return,” the actualization of “the dynamic whole which embraces great negation 
and great affirmation at once,”20 the realization of formless-form. The illusion 
of a temporal sequence of “stages” is itself overcome. Barthes too presents his 
own idiosyncratic version of the “great return” motif. Thus the “subject” returns, 
as he puts it, not under “the illusion of a unity,” the consistency of an essential 
personality, but by way of “imagining oneself as individual” creating a “Active 
identity,” projecting playful, multiple and even contradictory personae as signs 
of the process of becoming. In much the same way as the legendary Zen-man 
becomes indistinguishable from the butchers and drinkers of the market-place, 
Barthes’s re-created “fictive-identity” becomes “the theatre of society in which 
we stage our plural” (PT 62), an identity which may bear all the marks of a social 
and cultural conformity (while differing radically from it) in the same way as
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Ch’ing-yuan’s first "stage” formulation bears a surface resemblance to that of 
the third.
Zen frequently compares the stripping of the layers of “illusion” which con­
stitute the ego to the process of peeling an onion (a process which negates any 
anticipation of reaching a core). In a well-known essay on literary style Barthes 
too spoke of the necessity of replacing the traditional metaphor of the text/ 
world as a fruit with a kernel (a form with a recoverable content) with that of 
‘‘an onion, a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, 
finally, no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except 
the infinity of its own envelopes... .”21 The Pleasure of the Text is itself a poly­
morphous enactment of exactly such a transition, from an essentially dualistic, 
projective and judgemental encounter with the text/world to that of a ludic and 
celebratory one. Indeed the "fragments” themselves dis-organize the conception 
of the text-world as a self-subsistent entity, a cultural essence to be appropriated 
or even consumed (as one for example ingests the collected works of an author), 
replacing it with that of a reticle, the infinite set of possibilities generated by 
the coruscation of verbal particles which make up the weave. In parallel fashion 
the "readerly” site in front of the text (with its implicit assumption of a mind­
body dualism, a gap between ego and object, form and its content, interpretation 
and meaning) is collapsed into mobile modes of being-in-the-text/world, a praxis 
which is at once spontaneous, a-temporal, and ecstatic.
21 Literary Style: A Symposium, ed. Seymour Chatman (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), p. 10.
In so doing Barthes transplants something of the deconstructive and iconoclas­
tic activity which is native to Zen (the tearing-up of sutra scrolls, the killing of 
the patriarchs and the Buddha) into a contemporary Western cultural context 
Thus he adapts and “plays” with Zen noetic modes of experience, using them 
not only to subvert particular manifestations of the structuralist enterprise (in 
the way for example that his essay Jacob's Struggle with the Angel is designed to 
subvert the Proppian model, and his book S/Z to subvert all systematic ap­
proaches to the text) but also to disengage the mind from the forms it invents. 
In so doing he persistently drives language to the edge of intelligibility, to that 
point of neologistic exhaustion at which it passes over into the constitutions of 
silence.
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